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WHY TRANSGENDER CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE  
THE RIGHT TO BLOCK THEIR OWN PUBERTY  
WITH COURT AUTHORIZATION 
Federica Vergani* 
ABSTRACT 
Transgender children who wish to begin hormone suppression therapy 
are required to obtain their parents’ consent. This Comment argues that 
children should be able to access such treatments with court authorization in 
situations where their parents do not consent to the treatment. Gender identity 
is protected under the fundamental right to liberty because it is part of the 
person’s autonomy of self. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the right to make 
decisions pertaining to one’s sexuality are within the ambit of the right to 
privacy. For this reason, children have a right to privacy that includes the 
ability to decide whether to take hormone suppressants. The State’s interests 
in restricting this privacy right are not significant so as to render the parental 
consent requirement valid. Therefore, States must provide children with a 
judicial bypass procedure whereby they can access hormone suppression 
treatments without parental consent. 
 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................904 
II.  Background .....................................................................................906 
A. Transgender Background Information .....................................906 
B. Legal Background Information ................................................908 
C. Individual Autonomy in the Sexual Rights Context: Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth and Carey v. 
Population Services International ...........................................913 
III.  Children Have a Constitutional Right to Privacy ............................915 
IV.  Constitutional Scrutiny Test ............................................................916 
V.  Applying the Bellotti v. Baird Judicial Bypass Procedure ..............919 
 
*J.D. candidate, 2019, Florida International University (FIU) College of Law. This Comment is dedicated 
to all the children who don’t feel comfortable in their own skin, and all the adults equipped with the tools 
to help. I wish to thank my family for their constant love and support. I would also like to thank Professor 
Cyra A. Choudhury for her guidance throughout the writing process. Special thanks to Adrian Karborani, 
Editor-in-Chief, and Annasofia Roig, Executive Managing Editor, for their patience, encouragement, and 
feedback throughout the writing and editing process. I am also indebted to Natalie Oyarzun,  Amaia Sanz 
de Acedo, and Mary Corbin for their suggestions, inspiration, and moral support. Last, but certainly not 
least, thank you to the FIU Law Review Editorial Board and Staff for their extensive work on this 
Comment, and the entire issue.   
13 - VERGANI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/19 6:09 PM 
904 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:903 
A. Prong (1): Consultation with a Physician ................................919 
B. Prong (2): It Is in the Child’s Best Interests ............................922 
VI.  Conclusion .......................................................................................928 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
“No matter when you were born or where, puberty is the same. It’s the 
same for your parents as it is for you—what’s happening in your body 
dictates everything.”1 Puberty is a stage that is marked by physical, 
emotional, and psychological changes.2 These changes are difficult for all 
children, but they are especially taxing on children who are transgender.3 
That is because the process serves as an indication that the transgender child 
“will permanently be a member of the sex opposite to the one they experience 
themselves to be.”4 Transgender children also have trouble connecting 
socially and romantically with their peers, leading to anxiety and depression.5 
However, the children can alleviate these problems by taking puberty 
blockers, which act to pause the puberty of their birth-assigned gender until 
their bodies are ready for more invasive treatments.6 
Currently, there is neither a national nor international protocol to 
determine whether transgender children should be able to begin hormone 
therapy to suppress the development of sex characteristics of their birth-
assigned gender.7 In the absence of a protocol, two opposing views have 
emerged:  
[o]ne side argues that physical intervention should be 
delayed until the completion of puberty because teenagers 
are more likely than adults to change their minds about 
gender identity[], while t]he opposing view . . . argues for 
early endocrinologic intervention to prevent the severe 
depression that accompanies the onset of an unwanted 
 
1 Francine Pascal, Puberty Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/puberty. 
2 Bethany Gibson & Anita J. Catlin, Care of the Child with the Desire to Change Gender – Part 
I, 36 PEDIATRIC NURSING 53, 55 (2010). 
3 Id. 
4 Stephanie Brill and Jennifer Hastings, M.D., Transgender Youth: Providing Medical Treatment 
for a Misunderstood Population, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK (2009), 
https://www.nwhn.org/transgender-youth-providing-medical-treatment-for-a-misunderstood-
population/. 
5 Henriette A Delemarre-van de Waal & Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, Clinical Management of 
Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents: A Protocol on Psychological and Paediatric Endocrinology 
Aspects, 155 EUR. J. OF ENDOCRINOLOGY S131, S131 (2006) [hereinafter Cohen-Kettenis]. 
6 Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2 at 55–56. 
7 Norman Spack, Transgenderism, 12 LAHEY CLINIC MED. ETHICS J. 1, 2 (2005). 
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puberty and to avoid the physically and psychologically 
painful procedures required to reverse puberty’s physical 
manifestations.8  
If a child wishes to begin hormone therapy, medical consent laws and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence require parental consent.9 This 
requirement, however, proves problematic when the parents of the 
transgender child are not willing to consent to their child starting hormone 
therapy.  
This Comment proposes that States should provide a judicial bypass 
procedure for transgender children who want to begin hormone suppression 
therapy without their parents’ consent. Children have the right to make 
decisions concerning their gender identity because children enjoy the 
fundamental right to individual liberty, which encompasses the right to 
privacy and the right to individual autonomy. Although the United States 
Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and common law 
dictate that parents must consent to their children’s important medical 
decisions, the decision to transition is an exception. The State’s interests in 
restricting children’s privacy rights in that context are not significant to 
render the parental consent restriction valid. For this reason, States should 
provide minors with the option to obtain permission from a court to access 
the hormone treatments if they show either (1) that the decision was made in 
consultation with their physician, or (2) that the decision would be in their 
best interests. The decision to take puberty blockers will always be made with 
a physician consultation because such consultation is a requirement for 
beginning hormone therapy under both of the medical guidelines for 
transgender care. The decision will also always be in the child’s best interests 
because of the reversibility of puberty blockers, and because of the negative 
and dangerous consequences of delaying transition.  
Part II explains what being transgender is, what puberty blockers are, 
and also explains the current status of children’s rights to make decisions. 
Part III proposes that children have a right to privacy that encompasses the 
right to make decisions concerning their gender identity. Part IV explains 
why the parental notice requirement inhibits children’s privacy rights and is 
invalid because it does not serve a significant state interest. Part V introduces 
an adaptation of the Bellotti v. Baird test for a judicial bypass procedure that 
children may utilize to begin hormone therapy without parental consent. 
 
8 Id. 
9 See Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2, at 55–56. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. Transgender Background Information 
“One’s self-awareness as male or female evolves gradually during infant 
life and adulthood. This process of cognitive and affective learning happens 
in interaction with parents, peers, and environment.”10 However, normative 
psychological literature has yet to pinpoint when a person’s sexual identity is 
crystallized.11 Interestingly, almost all transgender adults felt like they were 
in the wrong body at the beginning of childhood.12  
“[P]ersistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of 
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex” is one of the two criterions 
for Gender Identity Disorder (GID) under the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).13 Children exhibit this 
disturbance by engaging in any of the following:  
in boys, assertion that his penis or testes are disgusting or 
will disappear or assertion that it would be better not to have 
a penis, or aversion toward rough-and-tumble play and 
rejection of male stereotypical toys, games and activities; in 
girls, rejection of urinating in a sitting position, assertion that 
she has or will grow a penis, or assertion that she does not 
want to grow breasts or menstruate, or marked aversion 
toward normative feminine clothing.14  
The second criteria is “a strong and persistent cross-gender identification, 
which is the desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex.”15 To 
satisfy this criterion, the DSM-IV-TR indicates that children will demonstrate 
four or more of the following:  
1) repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence that he or she 
is, the other sex,  
 
2) in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating 
female attire; in girls, insistence on wearing only 
stereotypical masculine clothing, 
 
10 Wylie C. Hembree et al., Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine Society 
Clinical Practice Guideline, 94 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132, 3135 (2009). 
11 Id. 
12 Spack, supra note 7, at 1. 
13 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(DSM-IV-TR) 576 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
14 Id. at 581. 
15 Id. at 576. 
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3) strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex roles in 
make-believe play or persistent fantasies of being the other 
sex, 
 
4) intense desire to participate in the stereotypical games and 
pastimes of the other sex,  
 
5) strong preference for playmates of the other sex.16  
“Because GID may be accompanied with psychological or psychiatric 
problems, it is necessary that the clinician making the GID diagnosis be able 
1) to make a distinction between GID and conditions that have similar 
features, 2) to diagnose accurately psychiatric conditions, and 3) to undertake 
appropriate treatment thereof.”17 The World Professional Association of 
Transgender Health Standards of Care (WPATH SOC) for the Health of 
Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People is the most 
recognized protocol for treating GID.18 Formerly called the Harry Benjamin 
International Gender Dysphoria Association, the WPATH is a professional 
society of “mental health professionals, endocrinologists, internists[,] and 
surgeons.”19 The WPATH SOC outline the stages of treatment for individuals 
with GID, which begin with “‘extensive exploration of psychological, 
family[,] and social issues’ by a mental health professional,” followed by 
reversible and then irreversible physical interventions.20  
The WPATH SOC have identified two sets of criteria—eligibility and 
readiness—that both adults and minors must satisfy to begin physical 
interventions including hormone treatment and sex-reassignment surgery.21 
The criteria for beginning hormone therapy are different for adults and 
children, while the criteria for sex-reassignment surgery are the same.22  
Hormone therapy begins with puberty blockers until the age of 16, when 
the individual can begin taking cross-sex hormones.23 Puberty blockers, more 
formally referred to as gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) analogs, are 
 
16 Id. at 581. 
17 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3136. 
18 Lois Jeannine Bookhardt-Murray, Care of the HIV-Infected Transgender Patient, MEDSCAPE 
(Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/761434_11. 
19 Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender Adolescents Can Access 
Puberty-Suppressing Hormone Treatment in the Absence of Parental Consent Under the Mature Minor 
Doctrine, 25 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.J. 179, 189 (2016). 
20 Spack, supra note 7, at 2. 
21 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3137–38. 
22 Id. 
23 Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2, at 57. 
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medications that suppress or inhibit puberty.24 Puberty blockers pause the 
bodily changes that would normally occur during puberty by suppressing the 
body’s production of testosterone or estrogen.25 This in turn gives the child, 
the child’s doctor, and the child’s family time to explore and consider 
whether the child truly wishes to transition.26 Hormone suppressing treatment 
also prevents the child from experiencing the emotional and psychological 
distress and discomfort of puberty in the child’s birth-assigned gender.27 
Puberty blockers are recommended by both medical guidelines for GID 
treatment—the WPATH SOC and the Endocrine Society—because they are 
“fully reversible interventions.”28 If the child decides at any point that they 
no longer want to transition, the child can stop taking the puberty blockers 
and their body will begin puberty in their birth-assigned gender almost 
immediately.29 The reversibility of puberty blockers reduces the risks of 
administering the medication to a child who was “wrongly diagnosed as 
gender dysphoric.”30  
B. Legal Background Information  
The Fourteenth Amendment states: “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”31 The United 
States Supreme Court has interpreted the fundamental right to liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to include a right to privacy.32 This right to privacy 
protects the individual’s bodily integrity from interference by the State.33 The 
fundamental right to liberty also encompasses “an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”34  
 
24 Amy C. Tishelman, et al., Serving Transgender Youth: Challenges Dilemmas, and Clinical 
Examples, 46 AM. PSYCHOL ASS’N, 37, 40 (2015). 
25 Priyanka Boghani, When Transgender Kids Transition, Medical Risks Are Both Known and 
Unknown, PBS (June 30, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/when-transgender-kids-
transition-medical-risks-are-both-known-and-unknown/. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Eli Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-
Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 166 (2007). 
29 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3139. 
30 Ikuta, supra note 19, at 217. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
32 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915–16 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
33 Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
34 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
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The fundamental right to liberty has also been interpreted to include the 
right to parent.35 Parents have a fundamental right “to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” that is guaranteed 
to them by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 This 
right has been described as “essential,”37 “basic in the structure of our 
society,”38 and “established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”39 The Supreme Court first recognized this right in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, noting that the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to 
“establish a home and bring up children” and “control the education of their 
own.”40 This is because the parents’ “primary function and freedom include 
prepar[ing their children] for obligations[, a process which] the state can 
neither supply nor hinder.”41 Included within the right to parent is the parental 
consent requirement on a minor’s right to make important decisions.42  
However, the fundamental liberty right of parents to the custody, care, 
and nurture of their children is not absolute.43 When a parent’s decision 
jeopardizes a child’s safety or physical or mental health, or has a potential 
for significant social burdens, the State is legally required to intervene as part 
of their role as parens patriae.44 This is because the State has an interest in 
protecting the goals of a productive and self-perpetuating society as part of 
its role as guardian of the health and welfare of society at large.45 More 
importantly, the State has “an independent interest in the well-being of its 
 
35 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
36 Id.; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska., 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 
(1923). 
37 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
38 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
39 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. 
40 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 401. 
41 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
42 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979). 
43 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that . . . includes, to some extent, matters 
of conscience and religious conviction.”). 
44 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a 
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State 
to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the 
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) 
(“[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when 
their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”); id. at 624 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he presumption 
that a parent is acting in the best interests of his child must be a rebuttable one, since certainly not all 
parents are actuated by the unselfish motive the law presumes.”). 
45 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168. 
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youth.”46 As such, the State can infringe on parents’ fundamental rights by 
regulating child labor and imposing requirements such as school attendance 
and vaccinations.47 At the most extreme end of the spectrum, the State can 
also take custody of a minor child through court action if the child’s parent 
fails to provide proper protection, thereby placing the child in danger.48 The 
State has the power to invoke its parens patriae power at any point during 
the child’s minority, but the power is strongest when the child is younger and 
more immature.49 In this way, “[t]he parens patriae authority fades . . . as the 
minor gets older,” and effectively disappears when the child reaches the age 
of majority.50 The State’s parens patriae power is also grounded in the 
justification that the State has a compelling interest in the preservation of 
human life.51 For this reason, when a child’s life is threatened by either 
parental action or neglect, the State has a legal duty to intervene.52 These 
points demonstrate that the right to parent is limited.  
The right to parent is also limited by the fact that children, as individual 
citizens, are also entitled to Constitutional protections.53 The Supreme Court 
recognized this in In re Gault by stating, “whatever may be their precise 
impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone.”54 The Court reiterated this concept in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, where it stated, “Constitutional rights do not mature 
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age 
of majority.”55  
The Supreme Court has recognized children’s constitutional rights in a 
variety of different contexts. Such contexts include the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings;56 and specifically, that minors “are entitled to adequate notice, 
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their accusers” in 
those proceedings.57 Criminal proceedings involving children apply the same 
 
46 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968). 
47 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
48 Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated 
Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2084 (1996). 
49 Id. 
50 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989). 
51 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327. 
52 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327. 
53 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). 
54 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
55 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
56 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. 
57 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
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standard of proof as adult proceedings—beyond a reasonable doubt58—and 
children are also entitled to assert the privilege against forced self-
incrimination.59 Additionally, the Court also held that the prohibition against 
double jeopardy also applies to children.60 In regards to property interests, 
the Court in Goss v. Lopez held that children’s property interests cannot be 
intruded upon without due process of law.61 The Court also recognized that 
children have a constitutional right to free speech and expression in Tinker.62  
Nevertheless, there are three reasons for why the constitutional rights of 
minors cannot be equated to those of adults: “the peculiar vulnerability of 
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature 
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”63 First, 
Supreme Court decisions involving children’s claims to constitutional 
protections against deprivations of liberty reflect the Court’s recognition of 
children’s vulnerability.64 In Roper, the Court held that the imposition of the 
death penalty on juveniles under the age of 18 violated the Eighth 
Amendment because of the three differences between juveniles and adults.65 
The Court noted that juveniles have “a lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that result in poor decision-
making.66 Additionally, minors are also more “susceptible to negative 
influences and . . . peer pressure.”67 Finally, the character of children is less 
developed than that of adults, and therefore children’s personality traits are 
“more transitory, less fixed.”68 The Court’s recognition of children’s 
vulnerability is also reflected in the criminal adjudication context because 
minors’ criminal adjudication occurs within a completely separate entity.69  
Second, the Court has explicitly given States permission to limit 
children’s freedom to make important decisions with potentially serious 
consequences without parental oversight.70 The Court has stated that 
requiring a child to consult with his parent or guardian about important 
decisions is both in the child’s best interests and ideal for ensuring the child 
 
58 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
59 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
60 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1975). 
61 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
62 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
63 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
64 Id. 
65 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005). 
66 Id. at 569. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 570. 
69 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). 
70 Id. 
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makes the best decision.71 However, this rationale is grounded on two crucial 
presumptions. First, “that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, 
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult 
decisions.”72 The Court has stated that children do not “have the capacity to 
take care of themselves.”73 For this reason, parental consultation is ideal 
because children “lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take 
account of both immediate and long-range consequences.”74 Thus, the 
rationale behind the parental consent requirement is to protect the child from 
decisions that could be detrimental to the child.75 This justification becomes 
even more evident when applied to decisions within the context of medical 
care. Parents are required to consent to their children’s medical decisions 
because children are deemed immature, thus incapable of understanding the 
consequences and repercussions of important medical decisions.76 The 
second and more important reason for the parental consent requirement is the 
assumption that parents will act in the best interests of their children, mainly 
because of the “natural bonds of affection” that exist between parent and 
child.77  
Finally, parents’ supervisory function in the raising of their children 
further justifies limiting children’s freedoms.78 The State requires parents to 
be involved in, and consent to, their children’s important decisions because 
doing so protects children from their own immaturity and adverse 
government action.79 Additionally, parents’ right to care and control their 
children stems from parents’ role as the parties who are primarily responsible 
for those obligations, both financially and ethically.80 The State, as an 
 
71 See id. at 640. 
72 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
73 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
74 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640. 
75 See id. at 635. 
76 See id. at 640; see also U.S. CONG., OTA-H-467, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT: ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH VOLUME III: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH AND RELATED SERVICES, 
123 (1991) (“One rationale [for requiring parental consent to healthcare for minors] is that minors lack 
the capacity to make their own health care decisions and need to be protected from their own improvident 
decision-making. The legal presumption that minors are incompetent rests at least in part on an assumption 
of courts and legislators that minors as a class lack the requisite capacity to make health care decisions for 
themselves.”). 
77 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) 
(“[P]arents have an important ‘guiding role’ to play in the upbringing of their children . . . which 
presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.” (emphasis added)). 
78 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 637–38. 
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“impersonal political institution[],” is not equipped to undertake the process 
of preparing children for their additional obligations.81  
C. Individual Autonomy in the Sexual Rights Context: Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth and Carey v. 
Population Services International  
Notwithstanding the differences between adults’ and minors’ 
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has identified certain circumstances 
where the privacy and individual autonomy of children are protected under 
the Constitution to the same extent as adults. Notably, the Court’s 
jurisprudence extending these privacy rights to minors is almost exclusively 
within the sexual rights context.82 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed 
minors’ constitutionally protected right to have an abortion in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth and the right to use 
nonprescription contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services 
International.83 The Court based its reasoning in these two landmark cases 
on the fundamental right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.84  
In Carey, the Court acknowledged that minors have a fundamental 
liberty right to make individual choices about sexuality.85 The Court 
described the right to decide whether to bear a child as “among the most 
private and sensitive.”86 Although the Court declined to “define ‘the totality 
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state,’” it held that the right to 
privacy within the context of procreation extends to minors as well as 
adults.87 For this reason, the Court’s holding prohibits states from banning 
the sale of nonprescription contraceptives to minors.88 
In the context of an abortion, the Court in Danforth rejected giving 
parents the power of an arbitrary veto over the abortion decision of a daughter 
who is mature enough to become pregnant.89 In Danforth, the statute at issue 
conditioned an unmarried minor’s ability to undergo an abortion during the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy on the consent of a parent or person in loco 
 
81 Id. at 638. 
82 See generally Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633; Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 
(1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
83 Carey, 431 U.S. at 694; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
84 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 
(1973). 
85 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 692–94. 
86 Id. at 685. 
87 Id. at 692–93. 
88 Id. at 681–82. 
89 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
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parentis.90 The Court held that “the State does not have the constitutional 
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over 
the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s 
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.”91  
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court went one step further by 
requiring States to provide a pregnant minor with an alternative procedure 
through which to obtain an abortion without parental consent.92 The Court 
acknowledged that encouraging a minor to consult with her parents when 
making the “grave” and “very important” decision of obtaining an abortion 
was ideal and constitutionally proper.93 However, the Court stated that 
requiring this could become problematic in the context of an abortion.94 The 
decision to have an abortion is extremely unique because it is very time-
sensitive; the possibility of aborting “effectively expires in a matter of weeks 
from the onset of pregnancy.”95 Further, the consequences of the minor being 
denied the ability to have an abortion are more grave than for an adult.96 If a 
minor is denied the ability to have the abortion, she is at a significantly greater 
disadvantage than an adult in the same position.97 A minor is likely unable to 
financially support herself during the pregnancy and her child once it is born 
due to her lack of education, employment, and resources.98 Thus, the Court 
held that every minor must be guaranteed the opportunity to go directly to a 
court to get authorization to make the abortion decision alone, without first 
having to consult or notify her parents.99 The Court in Bellotti stated that a 
minor will be granted the authorization for an abortion if she shows either: 
“(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her 
abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her 
parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision 
independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.”100  
Finally, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Repdroductive Health, the Court 
listed four criteria that a bypass provision must meet:  
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979). 
93 Id. at 640–41. 
94 Id. at 642 (“The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion 
decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it 
legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.”). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 647–48. 
100 Id. at 643–44. 
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[(1)] allow the minor to show that she possesses the maturity 
and information to make her abortion decision, in 
consultation with her physician, without regard to her 
parents’ wishes[; (2)] allow the minor to show that, even if 
she cannot make the abortion decision by herself, ‘the 
desired abortion would be in her best interests’[; (3)] insure 
the minor’s anonymity[; and (4)] courts must conduct a 
bypass procedure with expedition to allow the minor an 
effective opportunity to obtain the abortion.101 
The Court’s holding dictates that certain important medical decisions require 
a judicial bypass to the parental consent requirement because parental 
consultation is not always in the child’s best interests. With this legal 
framework in mind, I will now discuss why hormone suppression therapy as 
a minor is one such decision where allowing the parents to have an arbitrary 
veto can have potentially grave consequences.  
III. CHILDREN HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY  
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated that the right to 
individual autonomy is included within the fundamental right to liberty 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.102 The fundamental right to liberty also encompasses “an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, [and] expression.”103  
Gender identity is defined as one’s “actual or perceived sex, and 
includes a person’s identity, appearance, or behavior, whether or not that 
identity, appearance, or behavior is different from that traditionally 
associated with the person’s sex at birth.”104 Because gender identity is part 
of the person’s autonomy of self, it follows that gender identity is protected 
under the fundamental right to liberty.105 
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth and Carey v. Population Services International further 
 
101 497 U.S. 502, 511–13 (1990) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44). 
102 539 U.S. at 574; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.”). 
103 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
104 Alexander John Goodrum, Gender Identity 101: A Transgender Primer, S. ARIZ. GENDER 
ALLIANCE (1998) at 53, 53. 
105 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could 
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”); see also 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
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support that the right to make decisions pertaining to one’s sexuality are 
within the ambit of the fundamental right to privacy protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In those decisions, the Supreme Court specifically 
extended the right to privacy, which flows from the fundamental right to 
liberty, to a minor’s ability to obtain an abortion and nonprescription 
contraceptives without parental consent.106  
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that minors are entitled to the protections of the Constitution, including the 
right to individual autonomy and the right to privacy.107 Accordingly, it 
follows that minors are entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s fundamental 
right to individual liberty, which includes the right to identify with the gender 
of their choice.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY TEST 
Having established that minors have individual privacy rights, it follows 
that the parental consent requirement represents a state restriction on that 
right. There is a heightened standard of scrutiny for when the State acts to 
limit or restrain a minor’s right to privacy. “State restrictions inhibiting 
privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve ‘any significant state 
interest . . . that is not present in the case of an adult.’”108 Notably, this 
standard of review is significantly less rigorous than that of strict scrutiny, 
which is required when evaluating adults’ privacy rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.109 This is due in part to the fact that the 
State’s control over children’s activities is broader than that of adults.110 
Additionally, the level of scrutiny is also reduced because the right of privacy 
involved is that of making decisions independently, and the Court’s 
jurisprudence has considered children to have a reduced capacity in making 
important decisions.111  
 
106 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
107 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
108 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75). 
109 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15. 
110 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (“The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has 
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than adults.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (“It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute 
designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards, broader than those embodied 
in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the 
scope of its authority over adults . . . .”). 
111 Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15; see also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. 
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The Court applied this test in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, where a 
state statute required the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a 
condition for an unmarried minor to undergo an abortion during the first 12 
weeks of pregnancy.112 The first interest the Court considered was that of 
“safeguarding . . . the family unit and of parental authority.”113 The Court 
found it difficult to believe that granting a parent the power to veto a decision 
to terminate the minor’s pregnancy made by the minor patient and her doctor 
would “strengthen the family unit.”114 Further, granting such a veto power to 
a nonconsenting parent likely would not improve that parent’s authority or 
control when the minor’s pregnancy has likely already severed the family 
bond.115 “Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of 
the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy 
of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”116 Thus, 
the Court held that the statute, which imposed a special consent requirement 
that was exercisable by someone other than the pregnant minor or her 
physician, violated Roe v. Wade because its justifications were insufficient.117 
Likewise, imposing the parental consent requirement on a minor’s 
decision to begin hormone suppression treatments is not sufficiently justified 
so as to pass constitutional scrutiny. When applied to the context of a 
transgender adolescent seeking to take puberty blockers, the parental consent 
requirement is not valid because it does not serve any significant state 
interest.  
It is important to note that unlike the requirement in Danforth, the 
requirement at issue here is not specifically mandated pursuant to a specific 
statute. Rather, the requirement is an established common law rule which 
stems from the general constitutional requirement that parents must consent 
to decisions concerning their children’s medical care.118 Nevertheless, the 
parental consent requirement serves as a restriction that inhibits the minor’s 
privacy right to access hormone treatment without parental consent.  
The Court in Danforth noted that the State interests served by the 
parental consent requirement for the abortion decision—protecting parents’ 
role in their children’s decision-making and protecting children from making 
 
112 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
113 Id. at 75. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) 
(“[P]arental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor’s 
right to make important decisions.”); Dalizza D. Marques-Lopez, Comment, Not So Gray Anymore: A 
Mature Minor’s Capacity to Consent to Medical Treatment, UNIV. HOUS. PERSP. ON HEALTH L. (Oct. 
2006), https://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/%28DM%29MatureMinor.pdf. 
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detrimental choices—did not justify the intrusion on the child’s right to 
privacy.119 Similarly, the State interests served by the parental consent 
requirement also do not justify denying a minor the ability to take puberty 
blockers without parental consent. The State’s interest in protecting the child 
from making a decision with long-term consequences is addressed by the 
medical guidelines for transition. “Psychological or psychiatric involvement, 
for a minimum period of six months before [puberty blocker] treatment and 
continuing until surgery” is one of the requirements for hormone therapy for 
minors.120 This extensive supervision by a mental health professional will 
protect the child from making a choice that could be detrimental to them. 
Additionally, the Court has also listed the long-term consequences of forcing 
a minor to have a baby as a reason for allowing the minor to obtain an 
abortion.121 Likewise, forcing a minor with GID to undergo puberty and wait 
until they reach the age of majority to begin transition will also have negative 
long-term consequences.122 Transgender children who are forced to undergo 
puberty in their birth-assigned gender are at a higher risk of suicide, will 
likely suffer depression and anxiety, and may turn to the black market to 
access the hormone treatments.123 
Furthermore, a transgender minor’s decision to begin transition is 
significantly more “private and sensitive” than the decision to procreate or 
abort a child. The decision to procreate or use nonprescription contraceptives 
is simple: do I want a child or not? Likewise, the decision of whether to abort 
a child, albeit more personal, is still a purely medical decision. Neither of 
these decisions call for an inquiry into the person’s identity and sense of self 
as in the decision whether to transition. As Professor Chai Feldblum states, 
“the liberty interest recognized by the [C]ourt in Lawrence—the right ‘to 
define one’s own concept of existence’—is an interest that speaks directly to 
. . . the efforts of transgender people to define their gender identity and 
expression”124 The decision of whether to transition is one that is as complex 
as it is intimate. Therefore, the benefits of parental consent are not as weighty 
as with other purely medical decisions since those decisions do not speak 
directly to a person’s sense of self. The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that “the choice to get married, to have a child, and to have sexual 
intimacy with a person of the same gender or opposite gender” are all 
included in the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
119 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74–75. 
120 Cohen-Kettenis, supra note 5, at S133. 
121 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979). 
122 Spack, supra note 7 at 2; Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2, at 54–56. 
123 Spack, supra note 7 at 2; Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2, at 54–56. 
124 See Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What Lawrence 
Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 116 (2006). 
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Amendment.125 The choice to transition to one’s preferred gender clearly falls 
within this legal framework. Thus, the State does not have the power to 
dictate when and whether an individual, minor, or adult makes this decision. 
It follows that a transgender minor should be able to take hormone 
blockers before puberty without parental consent because the decision is 
inherently an individual one that should be made independently. Thus, 
minors should not be denied the ability to begin puberty suppressing 
treatments when their parents refuse to consent. As noted above, the Court 
has held that “the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a 
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the 
physician and his patient.”126 Imposing a conditional parental consent 
requirement on a minor’s choice to begin taking puberty blockers would 
constitute a “blanket veto” that the Supreme Court has ruled is 
unconstitutional.127 However, states could avoid imposing this arbitrary veto 
by creating a judicial bypass procedure whereby children seeking to take 
puberty blockers could do so without their parents’ consent.  
V. APPLYING THE BELLOTTI V. BAIRD JUDICIAL BYPASS 
PROCEDURE 
The Court in Bellotti v. Baird stated that a minor will be granted the 
authorization for an abortion if she shows either: “(1) that she is mature 
enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in 
consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) 
that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired 
abortion would be in her best interests.”128 This test could be modified and 
applied to an adolescent seeking authorization from a court to take puberty 
blockers without having to provide parental notice or consent.  
A. Prong (1): Consultation with a Physician  
Being that a minor is as young as nine years old when they are eligible 
to begin taking puberty blockers, the portion of the Bellotti v. Baird test that 
requires the minor to show they are mature enough to make their decision 
independently is not applicable. Puberty blockers have to be administered as 
 
125 Id. at 126. 
126 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (emphasis added). 
127 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643; cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (holding that “the State may not 
impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition 
for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy.”). 
128 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44. 
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soon as puberty changes have begun.129 Puberty changes begin with the 
development of secondary sex characteristics.130 In boys, the first physical 
change is the growth of the testes and an increase in testosterone.131 In girls, 
the first sign of puberty is the increase in fat and breast tissue, which usually 
follows the start of breast development.132 The first menstrual period usually 
happens about two years later.133 Puberty blockers work by “freezing” the 
minor’s development to prevent the arrival of distinct secondary sex 
characteristics.134 The Endocrine Society refers to the Tanner Scale to 
determine when adolescents should begin treatment with puberty blockers.135 
The Tanner Scale separates physical development into stages that begin from 
childhood, and continue through adolescence into adulthood.136 Each Tanner 
stage is based on external primary and secondary sex characteristics.137 The 
Endocrine Society guidelines indicate that puberty blockers can begin during 
Stage Two to Stage Four, but they are most effective if they begin during 
Stage Two.138 Girls generally begin Stage Two at about eleven years old, at 
which point their breasts have not begun developing.139 Boys enter Stage Two 
at thirteen years old, and at that point their testes have not yet enlarged.140  
Furthermore, while it may be difficult to show that a minor is well-
enough informed to make this decision independently of their parents’ 
wishes, the Bellotti test accounts for this deficiency by involving a physician. 
A minor that wants to begin taking puberty suppressing hormones is not 
making this decision on their own. Rather, in order to begin any physical 
intervention, a transgender person must have first been assessed by medical 
professionals both physically and psychologically.141 The two main medical 
guidelines that have been developed to guide the treatment of transgender 
 
129 Id. at 643. 
130 Neil J. Salkind, Puberty, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1051 (Neil J. Salkind 
ed., 2005). 
131 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3140. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Jesse Green, S/He: Parents of Transgender Children are Faced with a Difficult Decision, and 
It’s One They Have to Make Sooner Than They Ever Imagined, NEW YORKER MAG. (May 27, 2012), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/transgender-children-2012-6/. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Justin Corfield, Tanner Stages, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL HEALTH 1643–44 (Yawei 
Zhang ed., 2008); see also Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3141, 3143. 
138 Green, supra note 134. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See Ikuta, supra note 19, at 189; see also id. at 216 (“The SOC and Endocrine Society 
guidelines stipulate that puberty blockers be administered only after the child has been diagnosed with 
gender dysphoria or GID and after psychiatric or mental health evaluations.”). 
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people both require extensive assessment by medical professionals prior to 
commencing treatment.142 The WPATH SOC advocates that physicians 
conduct an “extensive exploration of psychological, family, and social 
issues” before initiating any sort of physical intervention.143 Additionally, the 
WPATH SOC specifically includes special guidelines that account for 
children’s mental and psychological developmental differences.144 Under the 
WPATH SOC, minors seeking to begin treatment must “demonstrat[e] a 
long-lasting and intense pattern of gender non-conformity, [prove that their] 
gender dysphoria emerged or worsened with the onset of puberty,” and show 
that they do not have other medical or psychological problems that would 
interfere with the treatments sought.145 Similarly, the Endocrine Society notes 
that diagnostic procedures for adolescents typically involve a “complete 
psychodiagnostic assessment and, preferably, a child psychiatric 
evaluation.”146 The Endocrine Society is “a professional international 
organization devoted to research on hormones and clinical practice of 
endocrinology” that issues the other medical guideline for the treatment of 
people with GID.147 
Thus, a minor who wishes to begin treatment with puberty blockers 
would only be able to petition the court for authorization after acquiring their 
physician’s authorization. The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hat is best 
for a child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment 
of physicians in each case.”148 And therefore, in the case where the physician, 
after the extensive assessments required under the transgender medical 
guidelines, approves of the child’s hormone blocker treatment, the minor 
should be allowed to begin the treatment with the court’s approval. The 
extensive psychological assessments required under the transgender medical 
guidelines are specifically designed to reduce the chances of rash or 
impulsive decisions by the minor to begin treatment. “The usual justification 
for a parental consent or notification provision is that it supports the authority 
of a parent who is presumed to act in the minor’s best interests and thereby 
assures that the minor’s decision . . . is knowing, intelligent, and 
deliberate.”149 The fact that a physician would be required to assess and 
approve of the child’s puberty blocker treatment would ensure that the child’s 
 
142 See Ikuta, supra note 19, at 189. 
143 Coleman et al., supra note 28, at 176. 
144 See Amanda Kennedy, Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to Transgender 
Minors Regarding Transition, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 283 (2008). 
145 Coleman, supra note 143, at 177. 
146 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3136–37. 
147 Ikuta, supra note 19, at 190. 
148 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979). 
149 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990). 
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decision was truly in their best interests, and was knowing, intelligent, and 
deliberate.  
B. Prong (2): It Is in the Child’s Best Interests  
Further, even if the minor is not able to meet the first criterion of the 
bypass procedure set out in Bellotti v. Baird, the minor undoubtedly meets 
the second criterion. The second criterion states that even if the child is not 
able to make the decision independently, she may still get authorization if the 
desired procedure would be in her best interests.150 The decision to allow the 
child to begin the physical intervention would be in the child’s best interests 
because denying minors the ability to take puberty blockers prior to 
undergoing puberty has both medical and financial repercussions. “As 
compared with starting sex reassignment long after the first phases of 
puberty, a benefit of pubertal suppression is a relief of gender dysphoria and 
a better psychological and physical outcome.”151  
Also, allowing a transgender child to begin taking puberty blockers is in 
their best interests because hormone blockers are reversible. Puberty blockers 
are a group of medications, prescribed by endocrinologists, that suppress or 
inhibit puberty.152 Puberty-suppressing hormones “freeze” the child’s 
development before the child begins to develop secondary sex 
characteristics.153 They do this by suppressing the body’s development of 
either testosterone or estrogen.154 The child continues taking the puberty 
blockers until they reach the age of sixteen.155 At that point, the child will 
then begin taking cross-hormones, which will cause them to undergo 
adolescence in their desired gender instead of the gender they were assigned 
at birth.156 Therefore, if the individual decides to undergo surgery later on, 
there are less physical attributes of the wrong gender to correct or get rid 
of.157  
Allowing a minor to begin taking puberty blockers without parental 
consent is in their best interests because the effects of hormone treatments 
 
150 See Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979). 
151 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3140. 
152 Tishelman, supra note 24, at 39–40. 
153 See Ikuta, supra note 19, at 214. 
154 Susan Scutti, Transgender Youth: Are Puberty-Blocking Drugs an Appropriate Medical 
Intervention?, MED. DAILY (Jun. 24, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/transgender-youth-
are-puberty-blocking-drugs-appropriate-medical-intervention-247082. 
155 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3132. 
156 Id. at 3132–33; Green, supra note 134. 
157 Green, supra note 134. 
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are reversible and have no known negative consequences.158 The Endocrine 
Society declares that “[p]rolonged pubertal suppression using GnRH 
analogues [also referred to as puberty blockers] is reversible and should not 
prevent resumption of pubertal development upon cessation of treatment.”159 
The reversibility and low risk associated with puberty blockers also severely 
undermines the Supreme Court’s justification for the parental consent 
requirement because the decision does not necessarily have long-term, 
serious repercussions.160 The reversibility of puberty blockers also offers the 
benefit that the likelihood of administering hormone treatment to a child who 
turns out not to have gender dysphoria is minimal.161 If the individual taking 
the puberty blockers does not become a transgender adult or does not want 
to transition, the individual simply needs to stop taking the puberty-
suppressing drugs to re-start their puberty development.162 Their 
development in their assigned sex will resume almost immediately after the 
minor stops the hormone suppressing treatment.163 Ultimately, puberty 
blockers pose a minimal risk of “post-treatment regret” as compared to other 
procedures that permanently alter the body, such as cross-hormones or 
surgical intervention.164  
Puberty blockers are also in the child’s best interests because they buy 
the child time while the child determines if they truly want to transition. The 
treatment gives adolescents “time to reflect over their gender identity, 
without becoming trapped in a body that [feels] alien” and unnatural to them 
and may well not reflect their ultimate gender identity.165 Delaying puberty 
also has the benefit of ensuring “greater diagnostic precision” because both 
the child and the doctor can “further explore their gender identity and wish 
for sex reassignment.”166 It also allows time for the child’s parents and other 
family members to “get counseling and support as needed, notify and educate 
school personnel, and explore the full range of treatment options.”167 In this 
way, puberty blockers also alleviate the emotional distress and discomfort of 
 
158 See Ikuta, supra note 19, at 194. 
159 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3139. 
160 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
161 Kathryn Hickey, Minors’ Rights in Medical Decision Making, 9 JONA’S HEALTHCARE L., 
ETHICS, & REG. 100, 104 (2007). 
162 Hembree et al., supra note 10, at 3141. 
163 Id. 
164 Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex 
Reassignment Surgery, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361, 388 (2007). 
165 Simona Giordano, Lives in Chiaroscuro. Should we Suspend the Puberty of Children with 
Gender Identity Disorder?, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 580, 580 (2008). 
166 Gibson & Catlin, supra note 2, at 56. 
167 Id. 
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being forced to undergo puberty in the birth-assigned gender.168 Therefore, 
the consequences of denying minors the ability to begin puberty suppression 
treatments indicate that allowing children to undergo the treatments without 
parental consent is in their best interests. 
Further, allowing children to utilize a judicial bypass procedure to 
access puberty blockers is in their best interests because of the negative and 
dangerous effects of delaying transition. The rationale behind the parental 
consent requirement is to protect the child from decisions that could be 
detrimental to them. However, denying, rather than allowing, a minor the 
ability to begin transitioning to the sex they identify with would be 
detrimental to them.169 Gender dysphoria is classified as a mental disorder in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).170 
Minors with gender dysphoria suffer because of the disconnect between 
their assigned gender and their expressed gender. As a child with gender 
dysphoria starts to grow up and becomes more self-aware, they “evaluate 
themselves on the basis of gender compatibility . . . and suffer discomfort, 
even despair, when they come up wanting.”171 As the child continues to grow 
up, this stress increases since “[t]hey have to cope with adverse consequences 
of living with a self-concept that is never socially acknowledge or 
reinforced.”172 The Endocrine Society guidelines state that “an adolescent 
with GID often considers the pubertal physical changes to be unbearable.”173 
The guidelines indicate that forcing a minor with GID to undergo puberty—
rather than begin taking puberty blockers—puts the minor under significant 
stress.174 This stress, in turn, puts the minor “at high risk of violence, suicide, 
and substance abuse.”175 Suicide rates are two to three times higher among 
LGBT youth.176 On the other hand, hormone treatment has actually been 
proven to alleviate depression and reduce the risk of suicide in minors with 
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gender dysphoria.177 This is because “[t]he opportunity to take hormones can 
facilitate gender self-determination, validating gender youths’ assertion of 
their gender identities and providing them with a greater degree of control 
over the gender co-constructed through their daily interactions.”178 
Allowing the minor to undergo puberty (in lieu of taking puberty 
suppressing hormones) also leads the minor to experience “anxiety, 
depression, and confusion.”179 The minor will also avoid romantic 
relationships and friendships with classmates, making their adolescence out 
of sync with their peers.180 Even in situations where the minor does not avoid 
his peers, gender nonconforming children are often times bullied and 
harassed at school.181 In fact, almost two-thirds of LGBT youth interviewed 
by GLSEN for its survey on harassment in schools stated they had been 
harassed at school that year.182 Over forty percent of the children reported 
feeling unsafe at school because of their gender expression when they were 
asked how their gender expression affected their schooling.183 Over twenty-
five percent of the children surveyed reported they had heard their teachers 
or other faculty members make negative comments about a student’s gender 
expression.184 Forty-six percent of the children reported they had been 
verbally harassed by other students because of their gender expression, while 
twenty-six percent of students reported being physically harassed.185 As a 
result of this harassment, gender nonconforming youth oftentimes stop 
attending school altogether; they are five times more likely to miss school 
because of fear for their personal safety than heterosexual students.186 Over 
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twenty-five percent of LGBT youth drop out of school, which is more than 
triple the national average.187  
Denying minors with gender dysphoria the opportunity to begin 
treatments also results in physical health risks. Children who are denied 
access to puberty suppressing hormones from their doctors sometimes take 
matters into their own hands. These youth will find ways to initiate transition 
on their own without the benefits and safety precautions of medical advice or 
supervision. The child will sometimes “‘obtain medication [from] the illegal 
market’ and expose themselves to life-threatening conditions through 
unsupervised use of these drugs.”188 A study conducted by the San Francisco 
Department of Public Health found that about thirty percent of male-to-
female individuals surveyed who had taken hormones in the last six months 
had acquired them illegally.189 The risks involved in using illegally obtained 
hormones are twofold. The child might face criminal charges, or become 
subject to criminal justice proceedings.190 Worse still, the individual might 
contract HIV from using a dirty needle.191 The individual might also inject 
the improper dose, which could result in long-lasting side effects in the best-
case scenario, or death in the worst-case scenario.192  
Further, “[d]elaying sex reassignment until adulthood makes 
transitioning more difficult, less convincing, more expensive, and more 
invasive.”193 And even with surgery and cross-hormones, these obstacles are 
very difficult to completely rectify.194 The development of secondary sex 
characteristics—such as an adam’s apple, hips, or breasts—is permanent 
without invasive surgical intervention.195 This invasive surgical intervention 
undoubtedly poses a much greater health risk than allowing the child to take 
puberty suppressing hormones. For an individual born as a male, puberty 
begins with the development of a deeper voice and a beard, which can be 
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very difficult to change when the individual wants to transition to a female.196 
Likewise, an individual born as a female will begin to develop hips and 
breasts, which will also be hard to eliminate later.197 “In fact, the primary 
cause of health issues for postoperative transsexual people are factors that 
make it difficult for them to pass as their [own] gender or remind them of 
their transsexualism.”198  
These factors indicate that, in situations where the minor cannot show 
she is mature enough to make the decision on her own, the court should 
authorize her ability to begin hormone treatment because it is in her best 
interests. Moreover, this would also directly align with the State’s role as 
parens patriae. As noted above, when a parent’s decision jeopardizes the 
mental or physical health of the child or the child’s safety, the State is legally 
required to intervene.199 This is because when the child’s parents make 
decisions that jeopardize the health and safety of the child, they are 
effectively rebutting the presumption that parents will act in the best interests 
of their child.200 In fact, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects the fact 
that “the Court abandons its deferential stance when treatment implicates 
sensitive interests and cannot be postponed without causing harm to the 
child.”201 Such is the case with both seeking an abortion, as seen in Planned 
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, and in gaining access to nonprescription 
contraceptives, as seen in Carey v. Population Services International. And 
the situation involving access to puberty blockers is no different. Therefore, 
when a parent refuses to consent to a child’s desire to begin puberty-
suppressing hormone treatment, which is in the child’s best interests and 
protects the child’s health and safety, the State must step in as parens patriae. 
One way in which the State can intervene and ensure that the child’s interests 
are protected is by creating a judicial bypass procedure by which the court 
can authorize the child’s access to the puberty blockers treatment. 
Furthermore, the issues involved in gender identity implicate private 
concerns, and thus delaying the child’s access to the treatment could result in 
harm to the child’s health and safety. This supports the circumvention of the 
traditional parental consent requirement for medical care.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Having to go through puberty in the gender that you do not associate 
with can be both frustrating and extremely uncomfortable. Transgender youth 
that are forced to go through puberty in their birth-assigned gender 
experience stress, anxiety, and depression in the best-case scenario, and 
commit suicide in the worst. When these children are denied access to 
puberty suppressing medications by their parents, the State should exercise 
its parens patriae power and authorize the treatment via a judicial bypass. 
Doing so is in the best interests of transgender children because puberty 
blockers’ effects are completely reversible; if the child decides they no longer 
want to transition, they can stop the treatments and undergo puberty. Puberty 
blockers also buy time for the child and the child’s doctors to determine 
whether the child truly wants to transition. Additionally, puberty blockers 
give the child’s family members time to come to terms with the child’s plan 
to transition. Finally, hormone suppression treatment is in the child’s best 
interests because delaying transition has dangerous repercussions, including 
depression, suicide, or contracting HIV from administering black market 
hormone treatments. 
 
  
 
